Stakeholders in Bilateral Conflict
AbstractThe resolution of a conflict often has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties directly involved in the confrontation (e.g. labour negotiations in sectors of public interest, where a strike would impact on the public at large). Once this is recognised, models addressing negotiations in such situations ought to account for the role and interests of the stakeholder - a third party whose stake is linked to the original negotiations. In this paper we address the strategic role of stakeholders in bilateral confrontations that take the form of a war of attrition; we assume that the bilateral confrontation runs concurrently with the parties interaction with the stakeholder, that chooses strategically her timing to intervene and take action to promote agreement. We show that under complete information the interplay of different interests in this tripartite timing game results in delayed outcomes. We also explore the role of incomplete information and show that asymmetries of information do not necessarily translate in increased inefficiency.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0311008.
Date of creation: 27 Nov 2003
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on WinNT; to print on any;
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://126.96.36.199
stakeholders; bargaining; war of attrition;
Other versions of this item:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-11-30 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1999.
"The Generalized War of Attrition,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 175-189, March.
- Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1999. "The Generalized War of Attrition," Game Theory and Information 9901004, EconWPA.
- Bulow, Jeremy I & Klemperer, Paul, 1997. "The Generalized War of Attrition," CEPR Discussion Papers 1564, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1997. "The Generalized War of Attrition," NBER Working Papers 5872, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1997. "The Generalized War of Attrition," Economics Series Working Papers 1998-W01, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Jeremy I. Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1996. "The Generalized War of Attrition," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1142, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Paola Manzini & Clara PonsatÃ, 2010.
"Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes,"
- D. Abreu & F. Gul, 1998.
"Bargaining and Reputation,"
Princeton Economic Theory Papers
00s9, Economics Department, Princeton University.
- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994.
"A Course in Game Theory,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, January.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Benny Moldovanu, 1993.
"Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with "Externalities","
Discussion Paper Serie B
234, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1995. "Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1321-35, November.
- Ponsati C. & Sakovics, J., 1996.
"The war of attrition with incomplete information,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 54-54, February.
- Hendricks, Kenneth & Weiss, Andrew & Wilson, Charles, 1987.
"The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information,"
87-03, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Hendricks, Ken & Weiss, Andrew & Wilson, Charles A, 1988. "The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(4), pages 663-80, November.
- Mark Fey & Kristopher Ramsay, 2009. "Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 233-250, September.
- P. Manzini & C. Ponsati, 2006. "Stakeholder bargaining games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 67-77, April.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.