Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Valuation Equilibria

Contents:

Author Info

  • Philippe Jehiel
  • Dov Samet

Abstract

We introduce a new solution concept for games in extensive form with perfect information: the valuation equilibrium. The moves of each player are partitioned into similarity classes. A valuation of the player is a real valued function on the set of her similarity classes. At each node a player chooses a move that belongs to a class with maximum valuation. The valuation of each player is \emph{consistent} with the strategy profile in the sense that the valuation of a similarity class is the player expected payoff given that the path (induced by the strategy profile) intersects the similarity class. The solution concept is applied to decision problems and multi-player extensive form games. It is contrasted with existing solution concepts. An aspiration-based approach is also proposed, in which the similarity partitions are determined endogenously. The corresponding equilibrium is called the aspiration-based valuation equilibrium (ASVE). While the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium is always an ASVE, there are other ASVE in general. But, in zero-sum two-player games without chance moves every player must get her value in any ASVE.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/0310/0310003.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0310003.

as in new window
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 08 Oct 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0310003

Note: Type of Document - ; pages: 18
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://128.118.178.162

Related research

Keywords: bounded rationality; valuation; similarity; aspiration.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2007. "Learning by Similarity in Coordination Problems," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp324, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  2. Philippe Jehiel & Dov Samet, 2010. "Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000040, David K. Levine.
  3. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August.
  4. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July.
  5. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2222, David K. Levine.
  6. Jehiel, Philippe, 2005. "Analogy-based expectation equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 81-104, August.
  7. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1995. "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 324-324, December.
  8. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2012. "Price Distortions in High-Frequency Markets," Discussion Papers 1549, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Vessela Daskalova & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2014. "Categorization and Coordination," Working Papers 719, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  3. Philippe Jehiel & Dov Samet, 2010. "Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000040, David K. Levine.
  4. Mohlin, Erik, 2014. "Optimal categorization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 356-381.
  5. Wichardt, Philipp C., 2012. "Existence of valuation equilibria when equilibrium strategies cannot differentiate between equal ties," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 709-713.
  6. Seel, Christian & Wichardt, Philipp C., 2012. "How burning money requires a lot of rationality to be effective," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 111-113.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0310003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.