In a two-stage two-public good experiment, we study the effect that subjects’ possibility of contributing to a public good in the first stage of the game has on the voluntary contributions to the second public good. Our results show that subjects do not follow either the Nash strategy or the Pareto efficient strategy and that they perceive the two public goods as substitutes.
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Experimental with number
0504002.
Find related papers by JEL classification: A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
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