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Contribution Norms in Heterogeneous Groups: A Climate Change Framing

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  • Zoe Van der Hoven

    ()

  • Martine Visser

    ()

  • Kerri Brick

    ()
    (SALDRU, School of Economics, University of Cape Town)

Abstract

While results from public good games with homogeneous players reflect the contribution norm of equal contributions, it is unclear what contribution norm will arise in a heterogeneous setting. Climate change is a perfect example of a social dilemma involving heterogeneous agents. As such, using a public good game with a climate change framing, this study examines what contribution norm arises when players are asymmetric in terms of their impact on the public good (mitigation). The climate change framing exacerbates equity considerations and ultimately increases the difficulty of finding a generalizable concept of fairness (contribution norm) acceptable to both player-types. The efficacy of communication as a means to promoting public good provision is also considered. The default contribution norm, irrespective of player-type, was to free-ride. With the introduction of communication, two dominant contribution norms emerge: free-riding and perfect cooperation.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town in its series SALDRU Working Papers with number 77.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ldr:wpaper:77

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Keywords: public good; contribution norm; communication; heterogeneity; climate change;

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