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Walverine: A Walrasian Trading Agent

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Author Info

  • Shih-Fen Cheng

    (Univ Michigan)

  • Evan Leung

    (Univ Michigan)

  • Kevin M. Lochner

    (Univ Michigan)

  • Kevin O'Malley

    (Univ Michigan)

  • Daniel M. Reeves

    (Univ Michigan)

  • L. Julian Schvartzman

    (Univ Michigan)

  • Michael P. Wellman

    (Univ Michigan)

Abstract

TAC-02 was the third in a series of Trading Agent Competition events fostering research in automating trading strategies by showcasing alternate approaches in an open-invitation market game. TAC presents a challenging travel-shopping scenario where agents must satisfy client preferences for complementary and substitutable goods by interacting through a variety of market types. Michigan's entry, Walverine, bases its decisions on a competitive (Walrasian) analysis of the TAC travel economy. Using this Walrasian model, we construct a decision-theoretic formulation of the optimal bidding problem, which Walverine solves in each round of bidding for each good. Walverine's optimal bidding approach, as well as several other features of its overall strategy, are potentially applicable in a broad class of trading environments.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/comp/papers/0302/0302003.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Computational Economics with number 0302003.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 25 Feb 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpco:0302003

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 23 . To appear in AAMAS-03. Extended version submitted for publication.
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

Related research

Keywords: trading agent; trading competition; tatonnement; competitive equilibrium;

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References

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  1. Wurman, Peter R. & Wellman, Michael P. & Walsh, William E., 2001. "A Parametrization of the Auction Design Space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 304-338, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Nielsen, Kurt, 2005. "Auctioning Payment Entitlements," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24566, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
  2. Kurt Nielsen & Jesper Troelsgaard Nielsen, 2010. "An Allocatively Efficient Auction Market for Payment Entitlements?," MSAP Working Paper Series 03_2010, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
  3. Yoav Shoham & Rob Powers & Trond Grenager, 2006. "If multi-agent learning is the answer, what is the question?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001156, David K. Levine.

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