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Environmental analysis for application layer networks

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Author Info

  • Schnizler, Björn
  • Neumann, Dirk
  • Veit, Daniel
  • Napoletano, Mauro
  • Catalano, Michele
  • Gallegati, Mauro
  • Reinicke, Michael
  • Streitberger, Werner
  • Eymann, Torsten

Abstract

Die zunehmende Vernetzung von Rechnern über das Internet lies die Vision von Application Layer Netzwerken aufkommen. Sie umfassen Overlay Netzwerke wie beispielsweise Peer-to-Peer Netzwerke und Grid Infrastrukturen unter Verwendung des TCP/IP Protokolls. Ihre gemeinsame Eigenschaft ist die redundante, verteilte Bereitstellung und der Zugang zu Daten-, Rechen- und Anwendungsdiensten, während sie die Heterogenität der Infrastruktur vor dem Nutzer verbergen. In dieser Arbeit werden die Anforderungen, die diese Netzwerke an ökonomische Allokationsmechanismen stellen, untersucht. Die Analyse erfolgt anhand eines Marktanalyseprozesses für einen zentralen Auktionsmechanismus und einen katallaktischen Markt. --

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Bayreuth, Chair of Information Systems Management in its series Bayreuth Reports on Information Systems Management with number 1.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:bayism:1

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Keywords: Grid Computing;

References

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