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If multi-agent learning is the answer, what is the question?

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  • Yoav Shoham
  • Rob Powers
  • Trond Grenager
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    File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4122247000000001156.pdf
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    Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 122247000000001156.

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    Date of creation: 27 Feb 2006
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    Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001156

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    1. Philippe Jehiel & Dov Samet, 2010. "Learning To Play Games In Extensive Form By Valuation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000034, David K. Levine.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play," Levine's Working Paper Archive 470, David K. Levine.
    3. Arrow, Kenneth J, 1986. "Rationality of Self and Others in an Economic System," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S385-99, October.
    4. Foster, Dean P. & Vohra, Rakesh, 1999. "Regret in the On-Line Decision Problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 7-35, October.
    5. Young, H. Peyton, 2004. "Strategic Learning and its Limits," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199269181, September.
    6. Shih-Fen Cheng & Evan Leung & Kevin M. Lochner & Kevin O'Malley & Daniel M. Reeves & L. Julian Schvartzman & Michael P. Wellman, 2003. "Walverine: A Walrasian Trading Agent," Computational Economics 0302003, EconWPA.
    7. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2000. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1127-1150, September.
    8. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2222, David K. Levine.
    9. Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
    10. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-81, September.
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    Cited by:
    1. Russell Golman & Scott Page, 2009. "General Blotto: games of allocative strategic mismatch," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 279-299, March.
    2. H. Peyton Young, 2007. "The Possible and the Impossible in Multi-Agent Learning," Economics Series Working Papers 304, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

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