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Theoretical and Computational Basis for Economical Ressource Allocation in Application Layer Networks - Annual Report Year 1

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Author Info

  • Eymann, Torsten
  • Reinicke, Michael
  • Streitberger, Werner
  • Schnizler, Björn
  • Veit, Daniel
  • Freitag, Felix
  • Chao, Isaac
  • Chacin, Pablo
  • Neumann, Dirk

Abstract

This paper identifies and defines suitable market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. --

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Bayreuth, Chair of Information Systems Management in its series Bayreuth Reports on Information Systems Management with number 7.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:bayism:7

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Keywords: Grid Computing;

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  1. Wellman, Michael P. & Walsh, William E. & Wurman, Peter R. & MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K., 2001. "Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 271-303, April.
  2. Wurman, Peter R. & Wellman, Michael P. & Walsh, William E., 2001. "A Parametrization of the Auction Design Space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 304-338, April.
  3. Wolinsky, Asher, 1988. "Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 71-84, January.
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