Targeting the Poor Using Community Information
AbstractGovernments and aid agencies target transfers to the poor, but audits to deter the rich are costly. This paper analyzes how community information can reduce targeting costs. If each community is given a hard budget constraint, then targeting costs can be substantially reduced by asking recipients to make reports about each other. Such a scheme is immune to collusion. Community information is of no help in targeting, however, if (a) it cannot be veri…ed by audits or (b) the government cannot commit to a hard budget constraint.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for International Development at Harvard University in its series CID Working Papers with number 22.
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Center for International Development at Harvard University (CID). 79 John F. Kennedy Street, Cambridge, MA 02138.
Web page: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/
More information through EDIRC
Targeting; Community Information; Audits; Collusion; Poverty.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-02-27 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Besley, T. & Coate, S., 1989.
"Workfare Vs. Welfare: Incentive Arguments For Work Requirements In Poverty Alleviation Programs,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
314, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Besley, T., 1988. "Workfare Vs. Welfare: Incentive Arguments For Work Requirements In Poverty Alleviation Programs," Papers 142, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Besley, T. & Coate, S., 1991. "Workfare vs. Welfare: Incentive Arguments For Work Requirements In Poverty Allevation Programs," Papers 73, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
- Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, Ivan, 1989. "Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 399-415, May.
- Conning, Jonathan & Kevane, Michael, 2001. "Community based targeting mechanisms for social safety nets," Social Protection Discussion Papers 23146, The World Bank.
- Bardhan, Pranab & Mookherjee, Dilip, 2005. "Decentralizing antipoverty program delivery in developing countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(4), pages 675-704, April.
- Chambers, Robert, 1994. "Participatory rural appraisal (PRA): Challenges, potentials and paradigm," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 22(10), pages 1437-1454, October.
- Alderman, Harold, 2002. "Do local officials know something we don't? Decentralization of targeted transfers in Albania," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 375-404, March.
- Jackson, Matthew O., 1999.
"A Crash Course in Implementation Theory,"
1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Ma, Ching-To, 1988. "Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 555-72, October.
- Galasso, Emanuela & Ravallion, Martin, 2000. "Distributional outcomes of a decentralized welfare program," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2316, The World Bank.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.