In this paper we analyze the effects on the welfare of heterogeneous native workers in the context of the presence of legal and illegal immigrants, and where the main instrument of economic policy takes the form of entry quotas. In the framework of a model of overlapping generations, we find that these effects are not monotonous. More particularly, we note that in certain circumstances the effects on the native workers of a change in the quota are opposite in nature, depending on whether or not these workers are qualified. The key aspect of this result is, on the one hand, the effect of illegal immigration on wages and, on the other, the part of income generated by the illegal immigrants that is appropriated by the natives for managing this “informal” labour market. Keywords: Illegal immigration; entry quotas; qualification. JEL: F22, J61,J68.
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Paper provided by European Regional Science Association in its series ERSA conference papers with number
ersa04p125.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Francesco Daveri & Riccardo Faini, .
"Where do migrants go?,"
Working Papers
124, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
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