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Why Are Some Public Officials More Corrupt Than Others?

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Author Info
Jennifer Hunt ()

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Abstract

Using detailed Peruvian data measuring bribery, I assess which types of public official are most corrupt and why. I distinguish between the bribery rate and the size of bribes received, and seek to explain the variation in each across public institutions. The characteristics of officials’ clients explain most of the variation for bribery rates, but none for bribe amounts. A measure of the speed of honest service at the institution explains much of the remaining variation for both bribery rates and amounts. The results indicate that the bribery rate is higher at institutions with bribe-prone clients, and that bribery rates and bribe amounts are higher where clients are frustrated at slow service. Faster and better service would reduce corruption. Overall, the judiciary and the police are by far the most corrupt institutions.

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Paper provided by William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School in its series William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series with number wp790.

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Date of creation: 01 Sep 2005
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Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2005-790

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Related research
Keywords: Corruption bribery institutions governance.

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
O1 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. John McMillan & Pablo Zoido, 2004. "How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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  2. John P. Haisken-DeNew & Christoph M. Schmidt, . "Inter-Industry and Inter-Region Differentials: Mechanics and Interpretation," Working Papers 9504, SELAPO Center for Human Resources. [Downloadable!]
  3. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Swamy, Anand & Knack, Stephen & Lee, Young & Azfar, Omar, 2001. "Gender and corruption," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 25-55, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Francisco Alvarez-Cuadrado, 2006. "A Quantitative Exploration Of The Golden Age Of European Growth: Structural Change, Public Investment, The Marshall Plan And Intra-European Trade," Departmental Working Papers 2005-01, McGill University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Hunt, Jennifer & Laszlo, Sonia, 2005. "Bribery: Who Pays, Who Refuses, What are the Payoffs?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5251, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Ades, Alberto & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1023-42, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Jennifer Hunt, 2004. "Trust and Bribery: The Role of the Quid Pro Quo and the Link with Crime," NBER Working Papers 10510, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Jakob Svensson, 2003. "Who Must Pay Bribes And How Much? Evidence From A Cross Section Of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(1), pages 207-230, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Borjas, George J. & Sueyoshi, Glenn T., 1994. "A two-stage estimator for probit models with structural group effects," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1-2), pages 165-182. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-81, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Naci Mocan, 2004. "What Determines Corruption? International Evidence from Micro Data," NBER Working Papers 10460, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2002. "Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 325-345, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Francisco Alvarez-Cuadrado, 2006. "A Quantitative Exploration Of The Golden Age Of European Growth: Structural Change, Public Investment, The Marshall Plan And Intra-European Trade," Departmental Working Papers 2005-01, McGill University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jennifer Hunt & Sonia Laszlo, 2005. "Bribery: Who Pays, Who Refuses, What Are the Payoffs?," NBER Working Papers 11635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Recanatini, Francesca & Montoriol-Garriga, Judit & Kaufmann, Daniel, 2008. "How does bribery affect public service delivery ? micro-evidence from service users and public officials in Peru," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4492, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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