The role of advocacy in competition policy : the case of the Argentine gasoline market
AbstractIn 2000 the Argentine antitrust authorities conducted a study of the state of competition in the gasoline market. The study concludes with a set of policy recommendations (that is, limits to vertical integration and to the duration of contracts between oil companies and gasoline stations) which were subsequently implemented by the Argentine government. This was one of the rare occasions where the Argentine antitrust authorities exercised its advocacy role in a country that underwent an extensive process of deregulation and privatization. Serebrisky assesses the design and impact of the policies recommended by the Argentine antitrust authorities. In particular, he evaluates under which circumstances the new policies can reduce barriers to entry and foster competition in the Argentine gasoline market.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3130.
Date of creation: 30 Sep 2003
Date of revision:
Labor Policies; Markets and Market Access; Economic Theory&Research; Environmental Economics&Policies; Oil&Gas; Transport and Environment; Oil Refining&Gas Industry; Access to Markets; Markets and Market Access; Environmental Economics&Policies;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Antonio Estache & Ginés de Rus, 2000.
"Privatization and Regulation of Transport Infrastructures: Guidelines for Policymakers and Regulators,"
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/44116, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Antonio Estache & Gines De Rus, 2000. "Privatization and Regulation of Transport Infrastructure : Guidelines for Policymakers and Regulators," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 15199, October.
- Severin Boreinstein & Andrea Shepard, 1996.
"Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(3), pages 429-451, Autumn.
- Borenstein, S. & Shepard, A., 1993. "Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gazoline Markets," Papers 93-22, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
- Severin Borenstein & Andrea Shepard, 1993. "Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets," NBER Working Papers 4489, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Andrea Shepard, 1993. "Contractual Form, Retail Price, and Asset Characteristics in Gasoline Retailing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 58-77, Spring.
- Slade, Margaret E, 1998. "Strategic Motives for Vertical Separation: Evidence from Retail Gasoline Markets," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 84-113, April.
- Ignacio Contin & Aad Correlje & Emilio Huerta, 1999. "The Spanish Gasoline Market: From Ceiling Regulation to Open Market Pricing," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 1-14.
- Vita, Michael G, 2000. "Regulatory Restrictions on Vertical Integration and Control: The Competitive Impact of Gasoline Divorcement Policies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 217-33, November.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.