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The role of advocacy in competition policy : the case of the Argentine gasoline market

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  • Serebrisky, Tomas

Abstract

In 2000 the Argentine antitrust authorities conducted a study of the state of competition in the gasoline market. The study concludes with a set of policy recommendations (that is, limits to vertical integration and to the duration of contracts between oil companies and gasoline stations) which were subsequently implemented by the Argentine government. This was one of the rare occasions where the Argentine antitrust authorities exercised its advocacy role in a country that underwent an extensive process of deregulation and privatization. Serebrisky assesses the design and impact of the policies recommended by the Argentine antitrust authorities. In particular, he evaluates under which circumstances the new policies can reduce barriers to entry and foster competition in the Argentine gasoline market.

Suggested Citation

  • Serebrisky, Tomas, 2003. "The role of advocacy in competition policy : the case of the Argentine gasoline market," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3130, The World Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3130
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Slade, Margaret E, 1998. "Strategic Motives for Vertical Separation: Evidence from Retail Gasoline Markets," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 84-113, April.
    5. Antonio Estache & Gines De Rus, 2000. "Privatization and Regulation of Transport Infrastructure : Guidelines for Policymakers and Regulators," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 15199, December.
    6. Andrea Shepard, 1993. "Contractual Form, Retail Price, and Asset Characteristics in Gasoline Retailing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 58-77, Spring.
    7. Ignacio Contin & Aad Correlje & Emilio Huerta, 1999. "The Spanish Gasoline Market: From Ceiling Regulation to Open Market Pricing," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 1-14.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hamid Baghestani & Jorg Bley, 2020. "Do directional predictions of US gasoline prices reveal asymmetries?," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 44(2), pages 348-360, April.

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