This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Locational choice and price competition: Some empirical results for the Austrian retail gasoline market

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Gerhard Clemenz ()
Klaus Gugler ()
Abstract

Using data from the Austrian retail gasoline market we test the following two hypotheses derived from spatial economics: (i) Retail shops are more densely located in areas with a higher population density. (ii) Spatial competition equilibrium prices are decreasing in the density of seller locations. Both hypotheses are well supported by the data. Population density explains more than 95% of the cross-district variation in the density of gasoline stations. With respect to the relationship between prices and gas station density the coefficient has the predicted sign and is significant at the 5% level or better in all specifications. Estimation as simultaneous equations does not alter our conclusions, and suggests causality running from station density to price.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Papers.Econ/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie0206.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number 0206.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Apr 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:0206

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.univie.ac.at/vwl

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Paper Administrator).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Slade, Margaret E, 1996. "Multitask Agency and Contract Choice: An Empirical Exploration," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(2), pages 465-86, May.
  2. Bresnahan, Timothy F & Reiss, Peter C, 1990. "Entry in Monopoly Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(4), pages 531-53, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Shepard, Andrea, 1991. "Price Discrimination and Retail Configuration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 30-53, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Considine, Timothy J., 2001. "Markup pricing in petroleum refining:: A multiproduct framework," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(10), pages 1499-1526, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Slade, Margaret E, 1987. "Interfirm Rivalry in a Repeated Game: An Empirical Test of Tacit Collusion," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(4), pages 499-516, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Capozza, Dennis R & Van Order, Robert, 1980. "Unique Equilibria, Pure Profits, and Efficiency in Location Models," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(5), pages 1046-53, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Baltagi, Badi H. & Griffin, James M., 1997. "Pooled estimators vs. their heterogeneous counterparts in the context of dynamic demand for gasoline," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 303-327, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Claycombe, Richard J. & Mahan, Tamara E., 1993. "Spatial aspects of retail market structure beef pricing revisited," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 283-291, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Slade, Margaret E, 1992. "Vancouver's Gasoline-Price Wars: An Empirical Exercise in Uncovering Supergame Strategies," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(2), pages 257-76, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Severin Borenstein, 1991. "Selling Costs and Switching Costs: Explaining Retail Gasoline Margins," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 354-369, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Severin Boreinstein & Andrea Shepard, 1996. "Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(3), pages 429-451, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Ronald N. Johnson & Charles J. Romeo, 2000. "The Impact Of Self-Service Bans In The Retail Gasoline Market," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(4), pages 625-633, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Slade, Margaret E, 1998. "Strategic Motives for Vertical Separation: Evidence from Retail Gasoline Markets," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 84-113, April.
  15. Rod Anderson & Ronald Johnson, 1999. "Antitrust and Sales-Below-Cost Laws: The Case of Retail Gasoline," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 189-204, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Joris Pinkse & Margaret E. Slade & Craig Brett, 2002. "Spatial Price Competition: A Semiparametric Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 1111-1153, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Slade, Margaret E, 1986. "Exogeneity Tests of Market Boundaries Applied to Petroleum Products," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 34(3), pages 291-303, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Richard Schmalensee & Thomas M. Stoker, 1999. "Household Gasoline Demand in the United States," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 645-662, May.
  19. Asplund, Marcus & Sandin, Rickard, 1999. "Competition in interrelated markets: An empirical study," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 353-369, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  20. Bresnahan, Timothy F & Reiss, Peter C, 1991. "Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 977-1009, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  21. B. Curtis Eaton & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1985. "Sophisticated Entry in a Model of Spatial Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(2), pages 282-297, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? To receive notification of recent additions to the database, subscribe to the free NEP reports.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-30.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.