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Locational choice and price competition: Some empirical results for the Austrian retail gasoline market

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Abstract

Using data from the Austrian retail gasoline market we test the following two hypotheses derived from spatial economics: (i) Retail shops are more densely located in areas with a higher population density. (ii) Spatial competition equilibrium prices are decreasing in the density of seller locations. Both hypotheses are well supported by the data. Population density explains more than 95% of the cross-district variation in the density of gasoline stations. With respect to the relationship between prices and gas station density the coefficient has the predicted sign and is significant at the 5% level or better in all specifications. Estimation as simultaneous equations does not alter our conclusions, and suggests causality running from station density to price.

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Paper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number 0206.

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Date of creation: Apr 2002
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Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:0206

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Cited by:
  1. Georg Götz & Klaus Gugler, 2006. "Market Concentration and Product Variety under Spatial Competition: Evidence from Retail Gasoline," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 225-234, December.
  2. Juan Jiménez & Jordi Perdiguero, 2012. "Does Rigidity of Prices Hide Collusion?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 223-248, November.
  3. Pichler, Eva & Böheim, Michael H., 2013. "Excise taxes on gasoline and suppliers’ market power: A note," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 110-112.
  4. Daniel Albalate & Jordi Perdiguero, 2012. "“Entry Regulation Asymmetries and Gasoline Competition in a Mixed Motorway Network”," IREA Working Papers 201218, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Nov 2012.
  5. Gnagey, Matthew, 2012. "Heterogeneous Developers, Spatial Interactions, and Land Development Outcomes under Uncertainty," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 124932, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  6. Bernd Jost, 2012. "Price Dispersion, Search Costs and Spatial Competition: Evidence from the Austrian Retail Gasoline Market," NEURUS papers neurusp166, NEURUS - Network of European and US Regional and Urban Studies.
  7. Csorba, Gergely & Koltay, Gábor & Farkas, Dávid, 2009. "Árak és koncentráció a magyar kiskereskedelmi üzemanyagpiacon
    [Prices and concentration on the Hungarian retail market for motor fuels]
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1088-1109.
  8. Stephen Hogg & Stan Hurn & Stuart McDonald & Alicia Rambaldi, 2012. "A Spatial Econometric Analysis of the Effect of Vertical Restraints and Branding on Retail Gasoline Pricing," NCER Working Paper Series 86, National Centre for Econometric Research.

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