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Regulatory reform in Mexico's natural gas industry : liberalization in the context of a dominant upstream incumbent

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Author Info
Rosellon, Juan
Halpern, Jonathan

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Abstract

The natural gas industry combines activities with natural monopoly characterisitics with those that are potentially competitive. Pipeline transport and distribution, which have natural monopoly characterisitcs, require regulation of price and non-price behavior. Production is a contestable activity, but in a few countries (including Mexico) it remains a state monopoly. Gas marketing is also contestable, but the presence of a dominant, upstream, vertically integrated incumbent may pose significant barriers to entry. Market architecture decisions--such as horizontal structure, regional development, and the degree of vertical integration--are also crucial. The authors report that Mexico has undertaken structural reform in the energy sector more slowly than many other countries,but it has introduced changes to attract private investment in natural gas transport and distribution. These changes were a response to the rapid growth in demand for natural gas (about 10 percent a year) in Mexico, which was in turn a response to economic development and the enforcement of environmental regulations. The new regulatory framework provides incentives for firms to invest and operate efficiently and to bear much much of the risk associated with new projects. It also protects captive consumers and improves general economic welfare. The continued vertical integration of the state-owned company Pemex and its statutory monopoly in domestic production posed a challenge to regulators. Their response in liberalizing trade, setting first-hand sales prices, and regulating natural gas distribution makes the Mexican case an interesting example of regulatory design. As the first phase of investment mobilization and competition for the market in Mexican distribution project concludes, remaining challenges include consistently and transparently enforcing regulations, coordinating tasks among government agencies, and ensuring expansion of gas transport services and domestic production. A key challenge in the near term will be fostering competition in the market. In strengthening the role of market forces, one issue is Pemex's discretionary discounts on domestic gas and access to transport services, made possible by its monopoly in domestic production and marketing activities and its overwhelming dominance in transport. The main instrument available to the regulator is proscribing Pemex contract pricing, but more durable and tractable instruments should be considered.

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Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 2537.

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Date of creation: 31 Jan 2001
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2537

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Related research
Keywords: Water and Industry; Oil Refining&Gas Industry; Energy and Environment; Oil&Gas; Carbon Policy and Trading;

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Fraser, Rob, 1995. "The Relationship between the Costs and Prices of a Multi-product Monopoly: The Role of Price-Cap Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 23-31, July.
  2. Neu, Werner, 1993. "Allocative Inefficiency Properties of Price-Cap Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 159-82, June.
  3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1994. "The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 507-37, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. David Sibley, 1989. "Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Price-Cap Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 392-404, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Bertoletti, Paolo & Poletti, Clara, 1997. "Welfare effects of discriminatory two-part tariffs constrained by price caps," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 293-298, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Bradley, Ian & Price, Catherine, 1991. "Average revenue regulation and regional price structure," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 89-108, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Mark Armstrong & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 1994. "Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510790, December.
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