Second-degree price discrimination and universal access under (weighted average) price cap regulation
AbstractThis paper analyzes the efficiency of the Price Cap regulatory scheme and its impact on universal access, when the monopolist is allowed to set a menu of alternative plans as part of a self-selection strategy (second-degree price discrimination) and the cap is calculated as the weighted average of the tariff plans he offers. In this context, we characterized the solution of the monopolist; who, besides offering a menu of plans more distorted than the second-best outcome -even distorting the plan for high-valuation consumers- because the trade-off between efficiency and rents extraction is exhibited in different way, can exclude consumers who are willing to pay for the service -shutdown policy- despite of universal access obligation have been imposed by the regulator. This happens regardless of the weighted average price cap (WAPC) set by the regulator. Consequently, if the Price Cap regulatory scheme is going to be used by the regulator, this mechanism must be applied to a single regulated plan, leaving the monopolist some flexibility to offer alternative plans that will be incentive compatible with this single regulated plan (tariff flexibility).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 31321.
Date of creation: Nov 2009
Date of revision:
price cap; non-linear tariffs; price discrimination; tariff flexibility; universal access;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Sharkey, William W. & Sibley, David S., 1993. "Optimal non-linear pricing with regulatory preference over customer type," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 197-229, February.
- Anja Lambrecht & Katja Seim & Bernd Skiera, 2007. "Does Uncertainty Matter? Consumer Behavior Under Three-Part Tariffs," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 26(5), pages 698-710, 09-10.
- Vogelsang, Ingo, 1989. "Two-part tariffs as regulatory constraints," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 45-66, June.
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