Poverty, Clientelism and Democratic Accountability in Mexico

Does democracy dampen clientelism and enhance accountability in social policy making? The conventional answer to this question is that democracy is more likely to redistribute income in favor of the poor. However, recent scholarly works present evidence that the distributive politics in emerging democracies often induces office-seeking politicians to manipulate social spending for electoral gain, which make social policy less accountable to impoverished citizens. This study provides some texture to the latter argument to show that policy-oriented and institutional reforms enacted in tandem with democratization work to constrain the clientelist distribution of social spending, and help promote programmatic redistribution in favor of the poor. Focusing on the case of Mexico, I demonstrate that the introduction of conditional cash transfer programs and the development of monitoring institutions over social programs tied politicians' hands by developing institutional constraints on discretionary spending. Using an original dataset, I compare the geographic distribution of Pronasol (Programa Nacional de Solidaridad, 1988-1994) and Progresa (Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación) (1997-2002), and Oportunidades (2002-2006), and demonstrate that Mexico's anti-poverty programs became increasingly pro-poor and less clientelist over time.Length: 49 pages