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Voter Buying: Shaping the Electorate through Clientelism

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  • F. Daniel Hidalgo
  • Simeon Nichter

Abstract

Studies of clientelism typically assume that political machines distribute rewards to persuade or mobilize the existing electorate. We argue that rewards not only influence actions of the electorate, but can also shape its composition. Across the world, machines employ “voter buying” to import outsiders into their districts. Voter buying demonstrates how clientelism can underpin electoral fraud, and it offers an explanation of why machines deliver rewards when they cannot monitor vote choices. Our analyses suggest that voter buying dramatically influences municipal elections in Brazil. A regression discontinuity design suggests that voter audits—which undermined voter buying—decreased the electorate by 12 percentage points and reduced the likelihood of mayoral reelection by 18 percentage points. Consistent with voter buying, these effects are significantly greater in municipalities with large voter inflows, and where neighboring municipalities had large voter outflows. Findings are robust to an alternative research design using a different data set.

Suggested Citation

  • F. Daniel Hidalgo & Simeon Nichter, 2016. "Voter Buying: Shaping the Electorate through Clientelism," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 60(2), pages 436-455, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:60:y:2016:i:2:p:436-455
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12214
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    Cited by:

    1. Mariella Gonzales & Gianmarco León-Ciliotta & Luis R. Martínez, 2022. "How Effective Are Monetary Incentives to Vote? Evidence from a Nationwide Policy," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 293-326, January.
    2. Toke Aidt & Zareh Asatryan & Lusine Badalyan & Friedrich Heinemann, 2020. "Vote Buying or (Political) Business (Cycles) as Usual?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 409-425, July.
    3. Kenju Kamei, 2021. "Incomplete Political Contracts with Secret Ballots: Reciprocity as a Force to Enforce Sustainable Clientelistic Relationships," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(2), pages 392-439.
    4. Stommes, Drew & Aronow, P. M. & Sävje, Fredrik, 2023. "On the Reliability of Published Findings Using the Regression Discontinuity Design in Political Science," I4R Discussion Paper Series 22, The Institute for Replication (I4R).
    5. Bartnicki, Sławomir & Alimowski, Maciej & Górecki, Maciej A., 2022. "The anomalous electoral advantage: Evidence from over 17,000 mayoral candidacies in Poland," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    6. Yuriko Takahashi, 2017. "Poverty, Clientelism and Democratic Accountability in Mexico," Working Papers 1620, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    7. Lewis, Blane D. & Nguyen, Hieu T.M. & Hendrawan, Adrianus, 2020. "Political accountability and public service delivery in decentralized Indonesia: Incumbency advantage and the performance of second term mayors," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    8. Ganslmeier, Michael, 2023. "Are Campaign Promises Effective?," EconStor Preprints 274069, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    9. Bullock, J., 2019. "Criminal Dominance and Campaign Concentration," Research Department working papers 1390, CAF Development Bank Of Latinamerica.
    10. Leopoldo Fergusson & Carlos Molina & Juan Felipe Riaño, 2018. "I Sell My Vote, and So What? Incidence, Social Bias, and Correlates of Clientelism in Colombia," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Fall 2018), pages 181-218, November.
    11. Jaehyun Song & Takeshi Iida & Yuriko Takahashi & Jesús Tovar, 2020. "Buying Votes across Borders? A List Experiment on Mexican Immigrants in the US," Working Papers 1919, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    12. Mark D. Ramirez, 2021. "Understanding public blame attributions when private contractors are responsible for civilian casualties," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 54(1), pages 21-40, March.

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