Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Political Screening: Theory and Evidence from the Argentine Public Sector

Contents:

Author Info

  • Ernesto Calvo

    ()
    (University of Maryland)

  • Gergely Ujhelyi

    ()
    (University of Houston)

Abstract

Politicians can benefit by ensuring that public sector positions requiring political services are occupied by partisans. We study a model in which this political screening is achieved by varying the amount of required political services and associated compensation in otherwise similar positions. Past vote shares reflect the population share of partisans, and we predict a U-shaped relationship between an employee's current salary and the incumbent politician's vote share at the time of hiring. We test for this effect using individual data from a large national income survey from Argentina, a country with widespread political patronage. The results are consistent with the model, showing that political conditions at the time of hiring have long-lasting effects on public employees' wages.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.uh.edu/econpapers/RePEc/hou/wpaper/201303201.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Houston in its series Working Papers with number 201303201.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 07 Jun 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hou:wpaper:201303201

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Houston TX 77023
Web page: http://www.uh.edu/class/economics/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: political patronage; screening; public employees;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," Economics Working Papers 0020, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  2. Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, 2005. "Contract Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262025760, December.
  3. Case, Anne, 2001. "Election goals and income redistribution: Recent evidence from Albania," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 405-423, March.
  4. Marco Manacorda & Edward Miguel & Andrea Vigorito, 2009. "Government Transfers and Political Support," NBER Working Papers 14702, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Andrea Prat & Oriana Bandiera & Tommaso Valletti, 2007. "Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000100, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Gregory, Robert G. & Borland, Jeff, 1999. "Recent developments in public sector labor markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 53, pages 3573-3630 Elsevier.
  7. Lakshmi Iyer & Anandi Mani, 2012. "Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 94(3), pages 723-739, August.
  8. Borjas, George J, 1980. "Wage Determination in the Federal Government: The Role of Constituents and Bureaucrats," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(6), pages 1110-47, December.
  9. Avinash Dixit & John Londregan, 1998. "Ideology, Tactics, And Efficiency In Redistributive Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 497-529, May.
  10. Easterly, William & Baqir, Reza & Alesina, Alberto, 2000. "Redistributive Public Employment," Scholarly Articles 4553013, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  11. Marco Battaglini, 2005. "Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 637-658, June.
  12. John G. Matsusaka, 2009. "Direct Democracy and Public Employees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 2227-46, December.
  13. Assar Lindbeck & J├Ârgen Weibull, 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 273-297, January.
  14. Armstrong, Mark & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1999. "Multi-dimensional screening:: A user's guide," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 959-979, April.
  15. Rauch, James E. & Evans, Peter B., 2000. "Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 49-71, January.
  16. Razvan Vlaicu, 2008. "Democracy, Credibility, and Clientelism," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(2), pages 371-406, October.
  17. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
  18. Borjas, George J., 1986. "The earnings of state government employees in the United States," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 156-173, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Gergely Ujhelyi, 2012. "Civil Service Reform," Working Papers 201303216, Department of Economics, University of Houston.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hou:wpaper:201303201. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dietrich Vollrath).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.