Identity, reputation and social interaction with an application to sequential voting
AbstractWe analyze binary choices in a random utility model assuming that the agent's preferences are affected by conformism (with respect to the behavior of the society) and coherence (with respect to his identity). We apply the analysis to sequential voting when voters like to win.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Applied Mathematics, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia in its series Working Papers with number 204.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2010
Date of revision:
identity; reputation; social interaction; random utility models; voting system.;
Other versions of this item:
- Emilio Barucci & Marco Tolotti, 2012. "Identity, reputation and social interaction with an application to sequential voting," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 79-98, May.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-11-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-11-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIC-2010-11-20 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2010-11-20 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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