Learning and equilibrium selection in a coordination game with heterogeneous agents
AbstractWe study a modified version of the coordination game presented in [van Huyck et al., 1994], where a representative selection dynamics was proposed to explain experimental data. Assuming that the agents adjust their moves in the direction of the best response, we derive a formal analysis of the stability of the equilibria. We show by simulation that the interior equilibrium is robustly reached even when considerable heterogeneity is allowed among the agents. Our truly multi-agent game is capable of approximating quite well both the median game convergence and the experimental data.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Applied Mathematics, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia in its series Working Papers with number 135.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: May 2006
Date of revision:
Coordination game; Equilibrium selection; Best reply dynamics;
Other versions of this item:
- Fogale, Alberto & Pellizzari, Paolo & Warglien, Massimo, 2007. "Learning and equilibrium selection in a coordination game with heterogeneous agents," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 380(C), pages 519-527.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- C15 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Statistical Simulation Methods: General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-05-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2006-05-20 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2006-05-20 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2006-05-20 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Levine's Working Paper Archive
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