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Learning and equilibrium selection in a coordination game with heterogeneous agents

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Author Info
Alberto Fogale
Paolo Pellizzari ()
Massimo Warglien (Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Venice)

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Abstract

We study a modified version of the coordination game presented in [van Huyck et al., 1994], where a representative selection dynamics was proposed to explain experimental data. Assuming that the agents adjust their moves in the direction of the best response, we derive a formal analysis of the stability of the equilibria. We show by simulation that the interior equilibrium is robustly reached even when considerable heterogeneity is allowed among the agents. Our truly multi-agent game is capable of approximating quite well both the median game convergence and the experimental data.

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File URL: http://www.dma.unive.it/wpdma/2006wp135.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Venice in its series Working Papers with number 135.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: May 2006
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Handle: RePEc:vnm:wpaper:135

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Related research
Keywords: Coordination game Equilibrium selection Best reply dynamics

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Computational Techniques
C15 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General - - - Statistical Simulation Methods

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  1. Selten, Reinhard & Stoecker, Rolf, 1986. "End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 47-70, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Reinhard Selten & Klaus Abbink & Ricarda Cox, 2005. "Learning Direction Theory and the Winner’s Curse," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 5-20, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kirman, Alan P, 1992. "Whom or What Does the Representative Individual Represent?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 117-36, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Shu-Heng Chen, John Duffy, Chia-Hsuan Yeh, . "Equilibrium Selection via Adaptation: Using Genetic Programming to Model Learning in a Coordination Game," The Electronic Journal of Evolutionary Modeling and Economic Dynamics, IFReDE - Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-10-6.

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