Dinámica evolutiva en un modelo de interacción entre visitantes y residentes de una localidad turística
AbstractIn this paper we model tourism development in the framework of multi- population dynamics and analyze the time pattern of its impact as the evolution of the interaction between two populations feeding over the same space-resource. Each population might be structured in two (or more) ?clubs? with variable membership, a club being a group of population members sharing social and economic interests as to the management of the relevant resource. Thus, each club has in principle a di¤erent set of strategies as to protection and valorization of broadly de?ned environmental resources at the tourist destination. Such resources share some of the characteristics of the so called commons. To represent such peculiar situation, we use Evolutionary Game Theory, in particular as is applied to the theory of evolution of interacting structured populations. In one such game, one strategy will be characterized as conservative and its alternative as depredative. Interaction between di¤erent strategies and the corresponding playing clubs gives rise to a rich dynamics, as some joint outcomes are inherently unstable, as is known, others being evolutionary stable. Such situation will be modelled by a version of the well known replicator dynamics, to emphasize its evolutionary nature.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics - dECON in its series Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) with number 1606.
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2006
Date of revision:
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ecuación del replicador; dinámica de imitación; sostenibilidad del turismo;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
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