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Dinámica evolutiva en un modelo de interacción entre visitantes y residentes de una localidad turística

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Author Info
Elvio Accinelli () (Departamento de Economía, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana)
Juan Gabriel Brida () (School of Economics and Management, Free University of Bolzano, Italy)
Edgar Carrera () (Facultad de Economia, Universidad Autonoma de Coahuila, México)
Lionello Punzo () (Dipartamento di Economia Politica, Universitá di Siena, Italy)

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Abstract

In this paper we model tourism development in the framework of multi- population dynamics and analyze the time pattern of its impact as the evolution of the interaction between two populations feeding over the same space-resource. Each population might be structured in two (or more) ?clubs? with variable membership, a club being a group of population members sharing social and economic interests as to the management of the relevant resource. Thus, each club has in principle a di¤erent set of strategies as to protection and valorization of broadly de?ned environmental resources at the tourist destination. Such resources share some of the characteristics of the so called commons. To represent such peculiar situation, we use Evolutionary Game Theory, in particular as is applied to the theory of evolution of interacting structured populations. In one such game, one strategy will be characterized as conservative and its alternative as depredative. Interaction between di¤erent strategies and the corresponding playing clubs gives rise to a rich dynamics, as some joint outcomes are inherently unstable, as is known, others being evolutionary stable. Such situation will be modelled by a version of the well known replicator dynamics, to emphasize its evolutionary nature.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics - dECON in its series Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) with number 1606.

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Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2006
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Handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:1606

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Related research
Keywords: ecuación del replicador; dinámica de imitación; sostenibilidad del turismo;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Recreation; Tourism

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Alos-Ferrer, Carlos & Ania, Ana B. & Schenk-Hoppe, Klaus Reiner, 2000. "An Evolutionary Model of Bertrand Oligopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 1-19, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hammerstein, Peter & Selten, Reinhard, 1994. "Game theory and evolutionary biology," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 28, pages 929-993 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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