This paper reports an experiment conducted to distinguish the effects of seller concentration, static market power and dynamic incentives to cooperate on posted-offer market performance. Results indicate that a combination of static market power and dynamic incentives to cooperate organize most deviations from Walrasian predictions. Concentration exerts little independent effect. Further, despite a high correlation between dynamic incentives to cooperate and prices, sellers fail to recognizably coordinate their actions. Rather, unstructured price signaling and response activities appear to drive outcomes. Excess capacity, a factor that affects the costs of price signaling is highly correlated with observed prices.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by VCU School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
0603.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)