Cooperation without Coordination: Signaling, Types and Tacit Collusion in Laboratory Oligopolies
AbstractWe study the effects of price signaling activity and underlying propensities to cooperate on tacit collusion in posted offer markets. The primary experiment consists of an extensively repeated baseline sequence and a 'forecast' sequence that adds to the baseline a forecasting game that allows identification of signaling intentions. Forecast sequence results indicate that signaling intentions considerably exceed those that are counted under a standard signal measure based on previous period prices. Nevertheless, we find essentially no correlation between either measure of signal volumes and collusive efficiency. A second experiment demonstrates that underlying seller propensities to cooperate more clearly affect collusiveness.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by VCU School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0702.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2007
Date of revision: Sep 2009
Experiments; Tacit Collusion; Price Signaling; Types;
Other versions of this item:
- Douglas Davis & Oleg Korenok & Robert Reilly, 2010. "Cooperation without coordination: signaling, types and tacit collusion in laboratory oligopolies," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 45-65, March.
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-03-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2007-03-17 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-COM-2007-03-17 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EXP-2007-03-17 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2007-03-17 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Roberto Burlando & Francesco Guala, 2005. "Heterogeneous Agents in Public Goods Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 35-54, April.
- Nathaniel T. Wilcox & Nick Feltovich, 2000. "Thinking Like a Game Theorist: Comment," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series archive-30, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- Durham, Yvonne & McCabe, Kevin & Olson, Mark A. & Rassenti, Stephen & Smith, Vernon, 2004. "Oligopoly competition in fixed cost environments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 147-162, February.
- Croson, Rachel T. A., 2000. "Thinking like a game theorist: factors affecting the frequency of equilibrium play," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 299-314, March.
- Douglas D. Davis & Oleg Korenok, 2009.
"Posted Offer Markets In Near-Continuous Time: An Experimental Investigation,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 47(3), pages 449-466, 07.
- Douglas D. Davis & Oleg Korenok, 2005. "Posted - Offer Markets In Near Continuous Time: an Experimental Investigation," Working Papers 0504, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics, revised 2007.
- Gunnthorsdottir, Anna & Houser, Daniel & McCabe, Kevin, 2007.
"Disposition, history and contributions in public goods experiments,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 304-315, February.
- Anna Gunnthorsdottir & Daniel Houser & Kevin McCabe & Holly Ameden, 2004. "Disposition, History and Contributions in Public Goods Experiments," Experimental 0401001, EconWPA.
- Smith, Vernon L & Suchanek, Gerry L & Williams, Arlington W, 1988. "Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1119-51, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oleg Korenok).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.