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A 2-Equation Model of the North Atlantic Economies, a Dynamic Panel Study

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  • David Kiefer

Abstract

Carlin and Soskice (2005) advocate a 3-equation model of stabilization policy to replace the conventional IS-LM-AS model. One of their new equations is a monetary reaction rule MR derived by assuming that governments have performance objectives, but are constrained by an augmented Phillips curve PC. They label their replacement model the IS-PC-MR. Central banks achieve the PC-MR solution by setting interest rates along an IS curve. Observing that governments have more tools than just the interest rate, we simplify their model to 2 equations. We develop a state space econometric specification as the solution of these equations, adding a random walk model of the unobserved potential growth. Applying this method to a panel of North Atlantic countries, we find it historically consistent with a few qualifications. For one, governments are more likely to target growth rates, than output gaps. And, inflation expectations are more likely backward looking, than rational, but a two-step estimation based on a forward-looking sticky-price model dramatically improves the empirical fit. Significant interdependence can be seen in the between-country covariance of inflation and growth shocks.

Suggested Citation

  • David Kiefer, 2010. "A 2-Equation Model of the North Atlantic Economies, a Dynamic Panel Study," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah 2010_06, University of Utah, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:uta:papers:2010_06
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    new Keynesian; Kalman filtering; open economies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy

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