Winfried Hochstättler () Robert Nickel () David Schiess ()
Abstract
We introduce a new model for two-sided markets that generalizes stable marriages as well as assignment games. Our model is a further generalization of the model introduced by Eriksson and Karlander [2]. We prove that the core of our model is always non-empty by providing an algorithm that determines a stable solution in O(n4).
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Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992.
"Two-sided matching,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,
in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541
Elsevier.
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Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986.
"Multi-Item Auctions,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-72, August.
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