Two Folk Manipulability Theorems In The General One-To-Two-Sided Matching Markets With Money
AbstractWe prove a “General Manipulability Theorem” for general one-to-one two-sided matching markets with money. This theorem implies two folk theorems, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, and provides a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem (Demange, 1982, Leonard, 1983, Demange and Gale, 1985).
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of São Paulo (FEA-USP) in its series Working Papers, Department of Economics with number 2013_01.
Date of creation: 18 Feb 2013
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Av. Professor Luciano Gualberto, 908 - CEP 05508-900 São Paulo - SP
Web page: http://www.fea.usp.br/feaecon/
More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986. "Multi-Item Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-72, August.
- Sotomayor, Marilda, 2007. "Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 155-174, May.
- Marilda Sotomayor, 2012. "A further note on the college admission game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 179-193, February.
- Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1985. "The Strategy Structure of Two-sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 873-88, July.
- Leonard, Herman B, 1983. "Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 461-79, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Pedro Garcia Duarte).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.