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Two Folk Manipulability Theorems In The General One-To-Two-Sided Matching Markets With Money

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  • David Pérez-Castrillo

    ()

  • Marilda Sotomayor

    ()

Abstract

We prove a “General Manipulability Theorem” for general one-to-one two-sided matching markets with money. This theorem implies two folk theorems, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, and provides a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem (Demange, 1982, Leonard, 1983, Demange and Gale, 1985).

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File URL: http://www.fea.usp.br/feaecon/RePEc/documentos/MarildaDavid01WP.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of São Paulo (FEA-USP) in its series Working Papers, Department of Economics with number 2013_01.

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Date of creation: 18 Feb 2013
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Handle: RePEc:spa:wpaper:2013wpecon1

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Keywords: Matching; competitive equilibrium; optimal competitive equilibrium; manipulability; competitive equilibrium mechanism; competitive equilibrium rule;

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  1. Sotomayor, Marilda, 2007. "Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 155-174, May.
  2. Leonard, Herman B, 1983. "Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 461-79, June.
  3. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986. "Multi-Item Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-72, August.
  4. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1985. "The Strategy Structure of Two-sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 873-88, July.
  5. Marilda Sotomayor, 2012. "A further note on the college admission game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 179-193, February.
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