Suggested retail prices with downstream competition
AbstractWe analyze vertical relationships between a manufacturer and competing retailers when consumers have reference-dependent preferences. Consumers adopt the manufacturerâ€™s suggested retail price as their reference price and perceive losses when purchasing above the suggested price and gains when purchasing below it. In equilibrium, retailers undercut price suggestions and the manufacturer suggests a retail price if consumers are sufficiently bargain-loving and perceive retailers as sufficiently undifferentiated. The manufacturer engages in resale price maintenance otherwise. Consumers can be worse off with suggested retail prices than with resale price maintenance, prompting a rethinking of the current legal treatment of suggested retail prices.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Utrecht School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 12-13.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 22 Feb 2013
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert & Clemens Puppe & Stephanie Rosenkranz, 2010. "Suggested retail prices with downstream competition," Working Papers 1203, University of Otago, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2012.
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2012-09-03 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2012-09-03 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2012-09-03 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MKT-2012-09-03 (Marketing)
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