The Contest for Olympic Succes as a Public Good
AbstractThis study considers the performance of countries at the Olympic Games as a public good. Firstly, it is argued that, at the national level, Olympic success meets the two key conditions of a public good: non-rivalry and non-excludability. Secondly, it is demonstrated that standard income inequality measures, such as the Lorenz curve and the Gini index, can be successfully applied to the distribution of Olympic success. The actual distribution of Olympic success is compared with alternative hypothetical distributions, among which according to population shares, the distribution favoured by a social planner and the noncooperating Nash- Cournot distribution. By way of conclusion, a device is proposed to make the distribution of Olympic success more equitable.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Utrecht School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 08-34.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
- I3 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty
- Z - Other Special Topics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-12-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2008-12-07 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2008-12-07 (Public Finance)
- NEP-SPO-2008-12-07 (Sports & Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Arne Feddersen & Wolfgang Maennig & Philipp Zimmermann, 2007.
"How to Win the Olympic Games - The Empirics of Key Success Factors of Olympic Bids,"
002, Chair for Economic Policy, University of Hamburg.
- Arne Feddersen & Wolfgang Maennig & Philipp Zimmermann, 2007. "How to Win the Olympic Games – The Empirics of Key Success Factors of Olympic Bids," Working Papers 0705, International Association of Sports Economists & North American Association of Sports Economists.
- Congleton, Roger D., 1984. "Committees and rent-seeking effort," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 197-209, November.
- Mark Baimbridge, 1998. "Outcome uncertainty in sporting competition: the Olympic Games 1896-1996," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(3), pages 161-164.
- Andrew B. Bernard & Meghan R. Busse, 2004. "Who Wins the Olympic Games: Economic Resources and Medal Totals," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 86(1), pages 413-417, February.
- Daniel K. N. Johnson & Ayfer Ali, 2004. "A Tale of Two Seasons: Participation and Medal Counts at the Summer and Winter Olympic Games," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 85(4), pages 974-993.
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