Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Stochastic evolution of rules for playing normal form games

Contents:

Author Info

Abstract

The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments of stochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal form games that arise. It is shown that many of the folk results of evolutionary game theory typically obtained with a fixed game and fixed strategies carry over to the present case. The results are also related to recent experiments on rules and games.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/761.pdf
File Function: Whole Paper
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 761.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jun 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:761

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

Related research

Keywords: Rules; evolutionary dynamics; stochastic dynamics; bounded rationality; learning; normal form games;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps, 2010. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 415, David K. Levine.
  2. M. Li Calzi, 2010. "Fictitious Play By Cases," Levine's Working Paper Archive 407, David K. Levine.
  3. Antonio Cabrales & Joel Sobel, 2010. "On the Limit Points of Discrete Selection Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 432, David K. Levine.
  4. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2222, David K. Levine.
  5. Josef Hofbauer & William H. Sandholm, 2002. "On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2265-2294, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin, 2008. "Contagion through learning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(4), December.
  2. Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2007. "Learning by Similarity in Coordination Problems," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp324, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  3. Fabrizio Germano, 2007. "Stochastic Evolution of Rules for Playing Finite Normal Form Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 62(4), pages 311-333, May.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:761. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.