Stochastic evolution of rules for playing normal form games
AbstractThe evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments of stochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal form games that arise. It is shown that many of the folk results of evolutionary game theory typically obtained with a fixed game and fixed strategies carry over to the present case. The results are also related to recent experiments on rules and games.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 761.
Date of creation: Jun 2004
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/
Rules; evolutionary dynamics; stochastic dynamics; bounded rationality; learning; normal form games;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-12-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2004-12-12 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2004-12-12 (Experimental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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