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Voto dual y abstención diferencial. Un estudio sobre el comportamiento electoral en Cataluña

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  • Clara Riba

Abstract

En este trabajo se presentan los resultados de un estudio empírico sobre los motivos del cambio sistemático de resultados electorales que se da en Cataluña según el ámbito de la convocatoria electoral de que se trate. La hipótesis, contrastada positivamente con datos del período 1982-1993, es que la victoria del partido nacionalista de centro derecha en las elecciones autonómicas en un territorio donde vencen siempre los socialistas en las elecciones legislativas se debe a la combinación de los fenómenos del voto dual y del abstencionismo diferencial. La aproximación metodológica de la elección racional permite construir grupos de electores que tienen distintas percepciones del espacio en el que se dirime la competición política, hecho que les induce a un comportamiento electoral diferenciado. Combinando estos resultados con los obtenidos del análisis con datos socioestructurales agregados, se establece un cierto perfil de los votantes duales y de los abstencionistas diferenciales. Finalmente, se realiza una interpretación de los resultados de las elecciones catalanas de 1995 y 1999 a la luz de los resultados de este estudio. This article presents the results of an empirical study about the reasons of the systematic change in the electoral results in Catalonia according to the type of elections. The hypothesis, positively tested with data from the period 1982-1993, is that the victory of the nationalist centre-right party in the autonomous elections in a region where always wins the socialist party in general elections, is due to the combination of the dual vote and differential abstention phenomena. The rational choice methodological approach allow to construct groups of electors with different perceptions about the space in which the political race takes place, fact that induces them different electoral behaviour. In combining these results with those obtained from the analysis with aggregated social and structural data, it is defined a certain the profile of the dual voters and the differential non-voters. Finally, it is given an interpretation of the Catalan election results in 1995 and 1999 using as a clue the results of this study.

Suggested Citation

  • Clara Riba, 2000. "Voto dual y abstención diferencial. Un estudio sobre el comportamiento electoral en Cataluña," Economics Working Papers 465, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:465
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Enelow,James M. & Hinich,Melvin J., 1984. "The Spatial Theory of Voting," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521275156.
    2. Beck, Paul Allen & Baum, Lawrence & Clausen, Aage R. & Smith, Charles E., 1992. "Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(4), pages 916-928, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Liñeira, 2016. "Second-Order Elections: Everyone, Everywhere? Regional and National Considerations in Regional Voting," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 46(4), pages 510-538.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Comportamiento electoral; elecciones; elecciones autonómicas; España; Cataluña; voto dual; abstención diferencial;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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