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Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects

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Abstract

In 2007, countries in the euro periphery were enjoying stable growth, low deficits, and low spreads. Then the financial crisis erupted and pushed them into deep recessions, raising their deficits and debt levels. By 2010, they were facing severe debt problems. Spreads increased and, surprisingly, so did the share of the debt held by domestic creditors. Credit was reallocated from the private to the public sectors, reducing investment and deepening the recessions even further. To account for these facts, we propose a simple model of sovereign risk in which debt can be traded in secondary markets. The model has two key ingredients: creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects. Creditor discrimination arises because, in turbulent times, sovereign debt offers a higher expected return to domestic creditors than to foreign ones. This provides incentives for domestic purchases of debt. Crowding-out effects arise because private borrowing is limited by financial frictions. This implies that domestic debt purchases displace productive investment. The model shows that these purchases reduce growth and welfare, and may lead to self-fulfilling crises. It also shows how crowding-out effects can be transmitted to other countries in the euro zone, and how they may be addressed by policies at the European level.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 1372.

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Date of creation: Jun 2013
Date of revision: Nov 2013
Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:1372

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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

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Keywords: sovereign debt; rollover crises; secondary markets; economic growth.;

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  1. Fernando Broner & Alberto Martin & Jaume Ventura, 2006. "Sovereign risk and secondary markets," Economics Working Papers 998, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Aug 2009.
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Cited by:
  1. Paolo Angelini & Giuseppe Grande & Fabio Panetta, 2014. "The negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 213, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  2. Hale, Galina & Obstfeld, Maurice, 2014. "The euro and the geography of international debt flows," Working Paper Series 2014-10, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  3. Camille Cornand & Pauline Gandré & Céline Gimet, 2014. "Increase in Home Bias and the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis," Working Papers 1419, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
  4. Harald Uhlig, 2013. "Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union," NBER Working Papers 19343, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Michele Fratianni & Francesco Marchionne, 2014. "Bank asset reallocation and sovereign debt," Working Papers 2014-09, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  6. Balteanu, Irina & Erce, Aitor, 2014. "Bank Crises and Sovereign Defaults in Emerging Markets: Exploring the Links," Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper 184, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
  7. Filippo Brutti & Philip Ulrich Sauré, 2014. "Repatriation of Debt in the Euro Crisis: Evidence for the Secondary Market Theory," Working Papers 2014-03, Swiss National Bank.
  8. Erce, Aitor, 2014. "Banking on seniority: the IMF and the sovereign’s creditors," Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper 175, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
  9. Camille Cornand & Pauline Gandré & Céline Gimet, 2014. "Increase in Home Bias and the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis," Working Papers halshs-01015475, HAL.
  10. Serkan Arslanalp & Takahiro Tsuda, 2014. "Tracking Global Demand for Emerging Market Sovereign Debt," IMF Working Papers 14/39, International Monetary Fund.

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