Within the spokes model of Chen and Riordan (2007) that allows for non-localized competition among arbitrary numbers of media outlets, we quantify the effect of concentration of ownership on quality and bias of media content. A main result shows that too few commercial outlets, or better, too few separate owners of commercial outlets can lead to substantial bias in equilibrium. Increasing the number of outlets (commercial and non-commercial) tends to bring down this bias; but the strongest effect occurs when the number of owners is increased. Allowing for free entry provides lower bounds on fixed costs above which substantial commercial bias occurs in equilibrium.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number
1133.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Matthew Ellman & Fabrizio Germano, 2004.
"What Do the Papers Sell?,"
Economics Working Papers
800, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 2006.
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