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Government intervention need for social security improvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: A theoretical analysis using the principal-agent model

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  • Didier Mumpambala Luzolo

Abstract

African populations need better support through social protection mechanisms. Among those who need social security are millions of older people who, having worked all their lives in the formal sector, are in precarious situations with lower benefits. This study aims to appreciate theoretically, using the principal-agent model, the need for government intervention as a way to improve social security in Democratic Republic of the Congo.

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  • Didier Mumpambala Luzolo, 2016. "Government intervention need for social security improvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: A theoretical analysis using the principal-agent model," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2016-165, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2016-165
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, 2005. "Contract Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262025760, December.
    2. Dorfman, Mark & Palacios, Robert, 2012. "World Bank support for pensions and social security," Social Protection Discussion Papers and Notes 70925, The World Bank.
    3. Palacios, Robert & Sluchynsky, Oleksiy, 2006. "Social pensions Part I : their role in the overall pension system," Social Protection Discussion Papers and Notes 36237, The World Bank.
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