Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the 1960s
AbstractLiberal economists have developed a framework of good governance as market-enhancing governance, focusing on governance capabilities that reduce transaction costs and enable markets to work more efficiently. In contrast, heterodox economists have stressed the role of growth-enhancing governance, which focuses on governance capacities to overcome entrenched market failures in allocating assets, acquiring productivity-enhancing technologies and maintaining political stability in contexts of rapid social transformation. The two are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but current policy exclusively focuses on the former, and ignores the strong empirical and historical evidence supporting the latter to the detriment of the growth prospects of poor countries.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs in its series Working Papers with number 54.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2007
Date of revision:
governance; market failures; transaction costs;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O20 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - General
- O30 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
- O40 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
- P14 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Property Rights
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-08-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2007-08-27 (Development)
- NEP-HIS-2007-08-27 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-HPE-2007-08-27 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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