Race, Bureaucratic Discretion, and the Implementation of Welfare Reform
AbstractThis paper explores the impact of the race of individual clients and of the local racial context on the implementation of sanctions for recipients of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) in a Midwestern state. We find that although nonwhites are sanctioned at lower rates than whites overall, nonwhites are sanctioned more compared to whites in each local area. This paradox occurs because nonwhites tend to live in areas with lower sanction rates. Consistent with the literature on race and policy, we find that sanction rates increase as the nonwhite population increases until a threshold is reached where nonwhites gain political power.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Missouri in its series Working Papers with number 0307.
Length: 36 pgs.
Date of creation: 17 Jul 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in American Journal of Political Science, (vol. 48, no. 2, April 2004) pp. 314-327
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
- J78 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Public Policy (including comparable worth)
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-01-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-POL-2005-01-02 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-URE-2005-01-02 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Orr, Larry L, 1976. "Income Transfers as a Public Good: An Application to AFDC," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(3), pages 359-71, June.
- Peter R. Mueser & Kenneth Troske & William J. Carrington, 2002.
"The Impact of Welfare Reform on Leaver Characteristics, Employment and Recidivism,"
0205, Department of Economics, University of Missouri, revised 26 Aug 2002.
- Carrington, William J. & Mueser, Peter R. & Troske, Kenneth, 2002. "The Impact of Welfare Reform on Leaver Characteristics, Employment and Recidivism," IZA Discussion Papers 561, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Mitnik, Oscar A., 2009.
"How Do Training Programs Assign Participants to Training? Characterizing the Assignment Rules of Government Agencies for Welfare-to-Work Programs in California,"
IZA Discussion Papers
4024, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Oscar Mitnik, 2008. "How do Training Programs Assign Participants to Training? Characterizing the Assignment Rules of Government Agencies for Welfare-to-Work Programs in California," Working Papers 0907, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
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