An inspection game model of the stolen base in baseball: A theory of theft
AbstractThis paper models the stolen base play in baseball as a simple inspection game. The model offers equilibrium predictions relating the frequency with which a stolen base play is attempted, and the frequency with which it is successful. Using an extensive play-by-play dataset from 37 Major League Baseball seasons, qualitative and quantitative support is found for the predictions of the model. An exogenous change in the average number of runs scored per game during the period covered by the dataset provides a natural experiment; the equilbrium model predicts the change in the relationship between attempt and success frequencies observed in the data.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. in its series University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series with number 032.
Date of creation: 15 Apr 2012
Date of revision:
Postal: Helen Chapman, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK
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