Environmental outcomes in a model of mixed duopoly
AbstractWe show under general demand and cost conditions that in a mixed duopoly with pollution the government will implement the socially optimal outputs and abatements by a tax-subsidy scheme and keeping the public fi rm fully public. The scheme requires taxing outputs and subsidizing abatements at diff erent rates, unlike a pollution tax. Our result contradicts some of the recent claims that social optimum is not implementable and privatization is necessary. We also show that when the private firm is partly foreign-owned, the government will adopt some privatization and will not implement the social optimum, though the social optimum is implementable.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. in its series University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series with number 030.
Date of creation: 07 Nov 2011
Date of revision:
Postal: Helen Chapman, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
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