Betting in the Shadow of Match-Fixing
AbstractTwo bookmakers compete in Bertrand fashion while setting odds on the outcomes of a sporting contest where an influential punter (or betting syndicate) may bribe some player(s) to fix the contest. Zero profit and bribe prevention may not always hold together. When the influential punter is quite powerful, the bookies may coordinate on prices and earn positive profits for fear of letting the `lemons' (i.e., the influential punter) in. On the other hand, sometimes the bookies make zero profits but also admit match-fixing. When match-fixing occurs, it often involves bribery of only the strong team. The theoretical analysis is intended to address the problem of growing incidence of betting related corruption in world sports including cricket, horse races, tennis, soccer, basketball, wrestling, snooker, etc.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. in its series University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series with number 011.
Date of creation: 05 Jul 2010
Date of revision:
Postal: Helen Chapman, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-07-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-SEA-2010-07-17 (South East Asia)
- NEP-SPO-2010-07-17 (Sports & Economics)
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