De la Percepción de la Corrupción a la coima: Un Puente Invisible
AbstractThis paper analyzes the perception that the Uruguayans have of the level of corruption in the country. We understand for corruption the illegal profit of the public officials from their position in the public office. In Uruguay the citizenship perceives that the level of the public officials' corruption is high. The more intense is the belief that the corruption is extended, there is a higher disposition of the citizens interviewed to consider that it is necessary to give a bribe to solve a problem with the officials. The citizen's personal experience with regard to corrupt acts is the fact that affects in a significant and important way the perception of the levels of corruption in the society.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics - dECON in its series Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) with number 0904.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2004
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Pablo Moyal & Juan Pablo Pagano & Máximo Rossi & Tatiana Rossi, 2008. "De la percepción de la corrupción a la ‘coima’: un puente invisible," REVISTA CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA, UN - RCE - CID.
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- Acemoglu, Daron & Verdier, Thierry, 1998.
"Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(450), pages 1381-1403, September.
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- Acemoglu, D. & Verdier, T., 1996. "Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach," Working papers 96-5, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Inna Cabelkova, 2001. "Perceptions of Corruption in Ukraine: Are They Correct?," Public Economics 0110004, EconWPA.
- Paolo Mauro, 1996. "The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure," IMF Working Papers 96/98, International Monetary Fund.
- Inna Cabelkova, 2001. "Perceptions of Corruption in Ukraine: Are They Correct?," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp176, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
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