Perceptions of Corruption in Ukraine: Are They Correct?
AbstractThis paper discusses the issue of perceptions and their influence on economic processes focusing on corruption perception. The higher the perceived corruption in an organization is, the more probable it is that a person dealing with that organization would offer a bribe, thus supporting corruption. Since corruption perceptions are rarely based on actual experience, they might describe reality inadequately. In this case the sources of corruption perceptions might facilitate or diminish the actual corruption level. This paper provides an empirical analysis of the association between corruption perception and the willingness to give bribes as well as the influence of different sources of corruption on corruption perception in Ukraine.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0110004.
Length: 58 pages
Date of creation: 28 Oct 2001
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Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; pages: 58 ; figures: included
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corruption perceptions; corruption; simultaneous system estimation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C31 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models
- C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-10-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-EEC-2001-10-29 (European Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2001-10-29 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2001-10-29 (Positive Political Economics)
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