Tournaments, gift exchanges, and the effect of monetary incentives for teachers: the case of Chile
AbstractIn this paper we evaluate the introduction of monetary incentives for teachers, based on a school performance tournament in Chile. We evaluate the tournament effect, i.e. the effect of introducing the incentive scheme on all participant schools: winners and losers. We also evaluate the effect of winning the tournament on next period school performance that we call the gift-exchange effect. Matching and Regression Discontinuity techniques are used to identify both treatment effects. The results indicate a positive and significant tournament effect and a positive but nonsignificant gift-exchange effect.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Chile, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number wp305.
Date of creation: Dec 2009
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Dante Contreras & Tomás Rau, 2012. "Tournament Incentives for Teachers: Evidence from a Scaled-Up Intervention in Chile," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(1), pages 219 - 246.
- I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-01-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAB-2010-01-16 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-URE-2010-01-16 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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- Muralidharan, Karthik & Sundararaman, Venkatesh, 2011. "Teacher opinions on performance pay: Evidence from India," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 394-403, June.
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