Misconceptions of Power: From Alchian and Demsetz to Bowles and Gintis
AbstractIs there any difference between Alchian and Demsetz’s ultra-liberalism and Bowles and Gintis’ radicalism? My answer is that, ontologically and methodologically, there is none. Their common neoclassical methodology results in the same conception of power as incompatible with Walrasian competition and the sole difference between them regards the extension of power and competition in reality. Paradoxically, notwithstanding Bowles and Gintis’ label of radicals, this conception coincides with the liberal view that sees competition as a natural and universal mode of social interaction (JEL L220, D230, B210).
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- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
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