A Non-Proposition-Wise Variant of Majority Voting for Aggregating Judgments
AbstractMajority voting is commonly used in aggregating judgments. The literature to date on judgment aggregation (JA) has focused primarily on proposition-wise majority voting (PMV). Given a set of issues on which a group is trying to make collective judgments, PMV aggregates individual judgments issue by issue, and satisfies a salient property of JA rules—independence. This paper introduces a variant of majority voting called holistic majority voting (HMV). This new variant also meets the condition of independence. However, instead of aggregating judgments issue by issue, it aggregates individual judgments en bloc. A salient and straightforward feature of HMV is that it guarantees the logical consistency of the propositions expressing collective judgments, provided that the individual points of view are consistent. This feature contrasts with the known inability of PMV to guarantee the consistency of the collective outcome. Analogously, while PMV may present a set of judgments that have been rejected by everyone in the group as collectively accepted, the collective judgments returned by HMV have been accepted by a majority of individuals in the group and, therefore, rejected by a minority of them at most. In addition, HMV satisfies a large set of appealing properties, as PMV also does. However, HMV may not return any complete proposition expressing the judgments of the group on all the issues at stake, even in cases where PMV does. Moreover, demanding completeness from HMV leads to impossibility results similar to the known impossibilities on PMV and on proposition-wise JA rules in general.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History) in its series Working Papers in Economic Theory with number 2013/02.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Francisco Tomás y Valiente, 5, 28049 Madrid
Web page: http://www.uam.es/departamentos/economicas/analecon/default.html
More information through EDIRC
judgment aggregation; judgment aggregation correspondences; proposition-wise majority voting; holistic majority voting;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-01-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-01-26 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIC-2013-01-26 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2013-01-26 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Conal Duddy & Ashley Piggins, 2012. "A measure of distance between judgment sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 39(4), pages 855-867, October.
- Dietrich Franz & List Christian, 2009. "Propositionwise judgment aggregation," Research Memoranda 020, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2007.
"Judgment aggregation without full rationality,"
023, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2005.
"Strategy-proof judgment aggregation,"
STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series
09, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Dietrich, Franz, 2011. "Scoring rules for judgment aggregation," MPRA Paper 35657, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- repec:ner:maastr:urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-15416 is not listed on IDEAS
- Nehring, Klaus & Pivato, Marcus & Puppe, Clemens, 2011. "Condorcet admissibility: Indeterminacy and path-dependence under majority voting on interconnected decisions," MPRA Paper 32434, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2005. "Judgment aggregation by quota rules," Public Economics 0501005, EconWPA.
- List, Christian & Pettit, Philip, 2002. "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(01), pages 89-110, April.
- Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2007. "Judgment aggregation with consistency alone," Research Memoranda 021, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- repec:ner:maastr:urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-15412 is not listed on IDEAS
- Franz Dietrich, 2005.
"Judgment aggregation in general logics,"
- Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2010. "Majority voting on restricted domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 512-543, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Raúl López-Pérez).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.