Carolin Häussler (Institute for Innovation Research, Technology Management, and Entrepreneurship, Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich, Kaulbachstr. 45, 80539 Munich, Germany. haeussler@bwl.uni-muenchen.de)
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The efficient allocation of control rights in inter-firm collaborations is a widely emphasized issue. In this paper, I empirically identify control rights and the allocation of these rights using a unique survey data set on collaborations between biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms. Fifteen control rights are identified to make up the structure of deals with five rights being the items of contention in deal mak-ing (ownership of patents, production, further development of the technology, the right to manage the collaboration, and the right to market universally). I find that the assignment of control rights is re-lated to the bargaining position of firms and incentive issues. Hence, goliaths –pharmaceutical incum-bents – subrogate critical rights to the new ventures when the final outcome of the project is depending on the venture’s effort.
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Paper provided by SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Papers with number
189.
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