Procurement with Costly Bidding, Optimal Shortlisting, and Rebates
AbstractWe consider the procurement of a complex, indivisible good when bid preparation is costly, assuming a population of heterogeneous contractors. Shortlisting is introduced to implement the optimal number of bidders, and we explore whether the procurer should reimburse the nonrecoverable cost of preparing a bid in whole or in part. We find that a reimbursement policy is profitable for the procurer only if performance and bidding costs are negatively correlated. Moreover, negative rebates (entry fees) always dominate positive rebates.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 166.
Date of creation: Sep 2006
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Procurement; Auctions; Entry;
Other versions of this item:
- Fan, Cuihong & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2008. "Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 98(3), pages 327-334, March.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Rationing; Licensing
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