Do China's State-Owned Enterprises Maximize Profit?
AbstractThe usual belief is that the China's state enterprise reform with contract management responsibility system has led state-owned enterprises to maximize profit. Nonetheless the poor performance of state-owned enterprises after the reform relative to other forms of enterprises remains a puzzle. As the existing explanations for this puzzle based on increased competition or soft budget constraint are not entirely satisfactory, the authors propose an alternative explanation based on the incentive aspect of the reform.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, La Trobe University in its series Working Papers with number 1998.07.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Enterprises; China Ownership;
Other versions of this item:
- Choe, Chongwoo & Yin, Xiangkang, 2000. "Do China's State-Owned Enterprises Maximize Profit?," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 76(234), pages 273-84, September.
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- Claustre Bajona & David L. Kelly, 2005. "Trade and the Environment with Pre-existing Subsidies: A Dynamic General Equilibrium Analysis," Working Papers 0603, University of Miami, Department of Economics, revised 01 Mar 2006.
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