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Influential Opinion Leaders

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  • Jakub Steiner
  • Colin Stewart

Abstract

We present a simple model of elections in which experts with special interests endorse candidates and endorsements are observed by the voters. We show that the equilibrium election outcome is biased towards the experts' interests even though voters know the distribution of expert interests and account for it when evaluating endorsements. Expert influence is fully decentralized in the sense that individual experts have no incentive to exert influence. The effect arises when some agents prefer, ceteris paribus, to support the winning candidate and when experts are much better informed about the state of the world than are voters.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number tecipa-403.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 16 Apr 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-403

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Keywords: Voting; coordination; experts;

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References

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  1. What Should We Do About Influential Opinion Leaders รข?? Expert Biases & Election Outcomes
    by Miguel in Simoleon Sense on 2010-04-29 14:47:37

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