Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories

Contents:

Author Info

  • Forsythe, R.

    ()
    (University of Iowa)

  • Myerson, R.
  • Rietz, T.

    (University of Iowa)

  • Weber, R.

Abstract

Do polls simply measure intended voter behavior or can they affect it and, thus, change election outcomes? Do candidate ballot positions or the results of previous elections affect voter behavior? We conduct several series of experimental, three-candidate elections and use the data to provide answers to these questions. In these elections, we pay subjects conditionally on election outcomes to create electorate with publicly known preferences. A majority (but less than two-thirds) of the voters are split in their preferences between two similar candidates, while a minority (but plurality) favor a third, dissimilar candidate. If all voters vote sincerely, the third candidate--a Condorcet loser--would win the elections. We find that pre-election polls significantly reduce the frequency with which the Condorcet loser wins. Further, the winning candidate is usually the majority candidate who is listed first on the poll and election ballots. The evidence also shows that a shared history enable majority voters to coordinate on one of their favored candidates in sequences of identical elections. With polls, majority-preferred candidates often alternated as election winners.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Iowa, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 91-31.

as in new window
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uia:iowaec:91-31

Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Iowa, Department of Economics, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, Iowa City, Iowa 52242
Phone: (319) 335-0829
Fax: (319) 335-1956
Web page: http://tippie.uiowa.edu/economics/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: elections ; economic models;

Other versions of this item:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2012. "Influential Opinion Leaders," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp458, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  2. Gschwend, Thomas, 2004. "Ticket-Splitting and Strategic Voting," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 05-06, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  3. Richard Potthoff, 2011. "Condorcet Polling," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 67-86, July.
  4. Marcelo Tyszler & Arthur Schram, 2011. "Information and Strategic Voting," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-025/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  5. Arnaud Dellis & Sean D’Evelyn & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2011. "Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system: an experiment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 171-200, July.
  6. André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2008. "Sincere, strategic, and heuristic voting under four election rules: An experimental study," Working Papers hal-00335046, HAL.
  7. Christoph Engel & Sebastian Kube & Michael Kurschilgen, 2011. "Can we manage first impressions in cooperation problems? An experimental study on “Broken (and Fixed) Windows”," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011_05, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  8. Meffert, Michael F. & Gschwend, Thomas, 2008. "Strategic Voting in Multiparty Systems: A Group Experiment," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 08-10, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  9. Thomas A. Rietz, 1993. "Strategic Behavior in Multi-Alternative Elections: A Review of Some Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers 1026, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Meffert, Michael F. & Gschwend, Thomas, 2007. "Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation and Coalition Governments: A Simulation and Laboratory Experiment," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 07-55, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uia:iowaec:91-31. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John Solow).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.