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Sincere, strategic, and heuristic voting under four election rules: An experimental study

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Author Info

  • André Blais

    (UdeM - Université de Montréal - Université de Montréal)

  • Jean-François Laslier

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

  • Nicolas Sauger

    (CEVIPOF - Centre de Recherches Politiques de Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS : UMR7048)

  • Karine Van Der Straeten

    (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris)

Abstract

Nous rendons compte d'une série d'expériences de laboratoire à propos des comportements de vote. Dans une situation où les sujets ont des préférences unimodales nous observons que le vote à un tour et le vote à deux tours génèrent des effets significatifs de dépendance du chemin, alors que le vote par approbation élit toujours le vainqueur de Condorcet et que le vote unique transférable (système de Hare) ne l'élit jamais. A partir de l'analyse des données individuelles nous concluons que les électeurs se comportent de manière stratégique tant que les calculs stratégiques ne sont pas trop complexes, auquel cas ils se repose sur des heuristiques simples.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00335046.

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Date of creation: Sep 2008
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00335046

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Related research

Keywords: Elections; comportement de vote.;

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References

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  1. Virginie Béhue & Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley, 2009. "La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote : une étude expérimentale," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2009044, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  2. Forsythe, R. & Myerson, R. & Rietz, T. & Weber, R., 1991. "An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories," Working Papers 91-31, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  3. Jean-Francois Laslier, 2006. "Strategic approval voting in a large electorate," Working Papers halshs-00121751, HAL.
  4. André Blais & Simon Labbé-St-Vincent & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2008. "Vote choice in one round and two round elections," Working Papers hal-00335060, HAL.
  5. Roger B. Myerson & Robert J. Weber, 1988. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," Discussion Papers 782, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. André Blais, 2002. "Why Is there So Little Strategic Voting in Canadian Plurality Rule Elections?," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 50(3), pages 445-454, 08.
  7. André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & Annie Laurent & Nicolas Sauger & Karine Van-Der-Straeten, 2007. "One Round versus Two Round Elections: An Experimental Study," Working Papers hal-00243055, HAL.
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Cited by:
  1. Jean-François Laslier, 2009. "In Silico Voting Experiments," Working Papers hal-00390376, HAL.

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