An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories
AbstractDo polls simply measure intended voter behavior or can they affect it and, thus, change election outcomes? Do candidate ballot positions or the results of previous elections affect voter behavior? We conduct several series of experimental, three-candidate elections and use the data to provide answers to these questions. In these elections, we pay subjects conditionally on election outcomes to create electorate with publicly known preferences. A majority (but less than two-thirds) of the voters are split in their preferences between two similar candidates, while a minority (but plurality) favor a third, dissimilar candidate. If all voters vote sincerely, the third candidate--a Condorcet loser--would win the elections. We find that pre-election polls significantly reduce the frequency with which the Condorcet loser wins. Further, the winning candidate is usually the majority candidate who is listed first on the poll and election ballots. The evidence also shows that a shared history enable majority voters to coordinate on one of their favored candidates in sequences of identical elections. With polls, majority-preferred candidates often alternated as election winners.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 962.
Date of creation: Aug 1991
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- Forsythe, R. & Myerson, R. & Rietz, T. & Weber, R., 1991. "An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories," Working Papers 91-31, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
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